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Abstract. Lookahead search is perhaps the most natural and widely used game playing
strategy. Given the practical importance of the method, the aim of this paper is to provide a
theoretical performance examination of lookahead search in a wide variety of applications.
To determine a strategy play using lookahead search, each agent predicts multiple levels
of possible re-actions to her move (via the use of a search tree), and then chooses the play
that optimizes her future payoff accounting for these re-actions. There are several choices of
optimization function the agents can choose, where the most appropriate choice of function will
depend on the specifics of the actual game - we illustrate this in our examples. Furthermore,
the type of search tree chosen by computationally-constrained agent can vary. We focus on the
case where agents can evaluate only a bounded number, k, of moves into the future. That is,
we use depth k search trees and call this approach k-lookahead search.
We apply our method in five well-known settings: AdWord auctions; industrial organization
(Cournot’s model); congestion games; valid-utility games and basic-utility games; cost-sharing
network design games. We consider two questions. First, what is the expected social quality
of outcome when agents apply lookahead search? Second, what interactive behaviours can be
exhibited when players use lookahead search?
Myopic game playing (whose corresponding equilibria are Nash equilibria), where each player
can only foresee the immediate effect of her own actions, is the special case of 1-lookahead
search. Thus, for the first question, it is natural to ask whether social outcomes improve when
players use more foresight than in myopic behaviour. The answer depends on the game played:
(i) In Adword auctions (or generalized second-price auctions), we show that 2-lookahead game
playing results in outcomes that are always optimal to within a constant factor; in contrast,
myopic game play can produce arbitrarily poor equilibrium outcomes.
(ii) For the Cournot game, applying 2-lookahead leads to a 12.5% increase in output and a
5.5% increase in social surplus compared with myopic competition. Similar bounds arise as
the length k of foresight increases.
(iii) For congestion games, as with myopic game playing, lookahead search leads to constant
factor qualitative guarantees.
(iv) For basic-utility games, on the other hand, whilst myopic game playing always leads to
constant factor approximations, additional foresight can lead to arbitrarily bad solutions!
(v) In a simple Shapley network design game, qualitative guarantees improve with the length
of foresight.
Regarding the second question, a variety of interesting game playing characteristics also
arise with lookahead search. Stackelberg leader-follower behaviours can be induced when the
players have asymmetric computational power. For example, Stackelberg equilibria can be pro-
duced in the Cournot game. Lookahead search can also generate “uncoordinated” cooperative
behaviour! An example of this is shown for the Shapely network design game.
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11. Introduction
Our goal here is not to prescribe how games should be played. Rather, we wish to analyse how
games actually are played. To wit we consider the strategy of lookahead search, described by Pearl
[58] in in his classical book on heuristic search as being used by “almost all game-playing programs”.
To understand the lookahead method and the reasons for its ubiquity in practice, consider an agent
trying to decide upon a move in a game. Essentially, her task is to evaluate each of her possible moves
(and then select the best one). Equivalently, if she know the values of each child node in the game tree
then she can calculate the value of the current node. However, the values of the child nodes may also
be unknown! Recall two prominent ways to deal with this. Firstly, crude estimates based upon local
information could be used to assign values to the children; this is approach taken by best response
dynamics. Secondly, the values of the children can be determined recursively by finding the values
of the grandchildren. At its computation extreme, this latter approach in a finite game is Zermelo’s
algorithm - assign values to the leaf nodes1 of the game tree and apply backwards induction to find
the value of the current node.
Both these approaches are special cases of lookahead search: choose a local search tree T rooted
at the current node in the game tree; valuations (or estimates thereof) are given to leaf nodes of T ;
valuations for internal tree nodes are then derived using the values of a node’s immediate descendants
via backwards induction; a move is then selected corresponding to the value assigned the root. For
best response dynamics the search tree is simply the star graph consisting of the root node and its
children. With unbounded computational power, the search tree becomes the complete (remaining)
game tree used by Zermelo’s algorithm.
We remark that the actual shape of the search tree T is chosen dynamically. For example, if local
information is sufficient to provide a reliable estimate for a current leaf node w then there is no need
to grow T beyond w. If not, longer branches rooted at w need to be added to T . Thus, despite our
description in terms of “backwards induction”, lookahead search is a very forward looking procedure.
Subject to our computational abilities, we search further forward only if we think it will help evaluate
a game node. Indeed, in our opinion, it is this forward looking aspect that makes lookahead search
such a natural method, especially for humans and for dynamic (or repeated) games.2
Interestingly, the lookahead method was formally proposed as long ago as 1950 by Shannon [68],
who considered it a practical way for machines to tackle complex problems that require “general
principles, something of the nature of judgement, and considerable trial and error, rather than a
strict, unalterable computing process”. To illustrate the method, Shannon described in detail how it
could be applied by a computer to play chess. The choice of chess as an example is not a surprise:
as described the lookahead approach is particularly suited to game-playing. It should be emphasised
again, however, that this approach is natural for all computationally constrained agents, not just for
computers. Lookahead search is an instinctive strategic method utilised by human beings as well.
For example, Shannon’s work was in part inspired by De Groot’s influential psychology thesis [31] on
human chess players. De Groot found that all players (of whatever standard) used essentially the same
thought process - one based upon a lookahead heuristic. Stronger players were better at evaluating
positions and at deciding how to grow (prune or extend) the search tree but the underlying approach
was always the same.
Despite its widespread application, there has been little theoretical examination of the consequences
of decision making determined by the use of local search trees. The goal of this paper is to begin
such a theoretical analysis. Specifically, what are the quantitative outcomes and dynamics in various
games when players use lookahead search?
1Often the values of the leaf nodes will be true values rather than estimates, for example when they correspond to
end positions in a game.
2 In contrast, strategies that are prescribed by axiomatic principles, equilibrium constraints, or notions of regret are
much less natural for dynamic game players.
21.1. Lookahead Search: The Model.
Having given an informal presentation, let’s now formally describe the lookahead method. Here we
consider games with sequential moves that have complete information. These assumptions will help
simplify some of the underlying issues, but the lookahead approach can easily be applied to games
without these properties.
We have a strategic game G(P,S, {αi : i ∈ P}). Here P is the set of n players, Si is the set of
possible strategies for i ∈ P, S = (S1×S2 . . .×Sn) is the strategy space, and αi : S → R is the payoff
function for player i ∈ P. A state s¯ = (s1, s2, . . . , sn) is a vector of strategies si ∈ Si for each player
i ∈ P.
Suppose player i ∈ P is about to decide upon a move. Recall, with lookahead search, she wishes to
assign a value to her current state node s¯ ∈ S that corresponds to the highest value of a child node.
To do this she selects a search tree Ti over the set of states of the game rooted at s¯. For each leaf
node l¯ in Ti, player i then assigns a valuation Πj,l¯ = αj(l¯) for each player j. Valuations for internal
nodes in Ti are then calculated by induction as follows: if player p is destined to move at game node
v¯ then his valuation of the node is given by
Πp,v¯ = max
u∈C(v¯)
[rp,v¯ + Πp,u¯].
Here, C(v¯) denotes the set of children of v¯ in Ti, and rp,v¯ is some additional payoff received by player
p at node v¯. Should p choose the child u¯∗ ∈ C(v¯) then assume any non-moving player j 6= p places
a value of Πj,v¯ = rj,v¯ + Πj,u¯∗ on node v¯. Then given values for children of the root node s¯ of Ti,
player i is thus able to compute the lookahead payoff Πi,s¯ which she uses to select a move to play at
s¯. [The method is defined in an analogous manner if players seek to minimise rather than maximise
their ”payoffs”.]
After i has moved, suppose player j is then called upon to move. He applies the same procedure
but on a local search tree Tj rooted at the new game node. Note that j’s move may not be the move
anticipated by i in her analysis. For example, suppose all the players use 2-lookahead search. Then
player i calculates on the basis that player j will use a 1-lookahead search tree T ′j when he moves –
because for computational purposes it is necessary that T ′j ⊆ Ti. But when he moves player j actually
uses the 2-lookahead search tree Tj and this tree goes beyond the limits of Ti.
1.2. Lookahead Search: The Practicalities.
Observe that there is still a great deal of flexibility in how the players implement the model. This
versatility, we would argue, is a major strength (and another reason underlying its ubiquity) and not
a weakness of the method. For example, it accords well with Simon’s belief, discussed in Section 1.4,
that behaviours should be adaptable. We now give some examples of this adaptability and highlight
those aspects that we analyse in this paper.
• Dynamic Search Trees. Recall that search trees may be constructed dynamically. Thus, the
exact shape of the search tree utilized will be heavily influenced by the current game node, and the
experience and learning abilities of the players. Whilst clearly important in determining gameplay and
outcomes, these influences are a distraction from our focal point, namely, computation and dynamics
in games in which players use lookahead search strategies. Therefore, we will simply assume here that
each Ti is a breadth first search tree of depth ki. Implicitly, ki is dependent on the computational
facilities of player i.
• Evaluation Functions. Different players may evaluate leaf nodes in different ways. To evaluate
internal nodes, as described above, we make the standard assumption that they use a max (or min)
function. This need not be the case. For example, a risk-averse player may give a higher value to a
node (that it does not own) with many high value children than to a node with few high value children
– we do not consider such players here.
• Internal Rewards or Not: Path Model vs Leaf Model. We distinguish between two broad
classes of game that fit in this framework but are conceptually quite different. In the first category,
payoffs are determined only by outcomes at the end of game. Valuations at leaf nodes in the local
3search trees are then just estimates of the what the final outcome will be if the game reaches that
point. Clearly chess falls into this category. In the second category, payoffs can be accumulated over
time - thus different paths with the same endpoints may give different payoffs to each player. Repeated
games, such as industrial games over multiple time periods, can be modelled as a single game in this
category. The first category is modelled by setting all internal rewards rp,v¯ = 0. Thus what matters
in decision making is simply the initial (estimated) valuations a player puts on the leaf nodes. We
call this the leaf (payoff) model as an agent then strives to reach a leaf of Ti with as high a value as
possible. The second category arises when the internal rewards, rp,v¯, can be non-zero. Each agent
then wishes to traverse paths that allow for high rewards along the way. More specifically, in this
model, called the path (payoff) model, the internal reward is rp,v¯ = αp(v¯).
• Order of Moves: Worst-Case vs Average-Case. In multiplayer games, the order in which
the players move may not be fixed. This adds additional complexity to the decision making process,
as the local search tree will change depending upon the order in which players move. Here, we will
examine two natural approaches a player may use in this situation: worst case lookahead and average
case lookahead. In the former situation, when making a move, a risk-averse player will assume that
the subsequent moves are made by different players chosen by an adversary to minimize that player’s
payoff. In the latter case, the player will assume that each subsequent move is made by a player chosen
uniformly at random; we allow players to make consecutive moves. In both cases, to implement the
method the player must perform calculations for multiple search trees. This is necessary to either find
the worst-case or perform expectation calculations.
1.3. Techniques and Results.
We want to understand the social quality of outcomes that arise when computationally-bounded agents
use k-lookahead search to optimise their expected or worst-case payoff over the next k moves. Two
natural ways we do this are via equilibria and via the study of game dynamics. To explain these
approaches, consider the following definition. Given a lookahead payoff function, Πi,s¯, a lookahead
best-response move for player i, at a state s¯ ∈ S, is a strategy si maximising her lookahead payoff,
that is, ∀s′i ∈ Si: Πi,s¯ ≥ Πi,(s¯−i,s′i). [A move s′i for player i, at a state s¯ ∈ S, is lookahead improving
if Πi,s¯ ≤ Πi,(s¯−i,s′i).] A lookahead equilibrium is then a collection of strategies such that each player is
playing her lookahead best-response move for that collection of strategies. Our focus here is on pure
strategies. Then, given a social value for each state, the coordination ratio (or price of anarchy) of
lookahead equilibria is the worst possible ratio between the social value of a lookahead equilibrium and
the optimal global social value.
To analyse the dynamics of lookahead best-response moves, we examine the expected social value
of states on polynomial length random walks on the lookahead state graph, G. This graph has a node
for each state s ∈ S and an edge from s¯ to a state t¯ with a label i ∈ P if the only difference between
s¯ and t¯ is that player i changes strategy from si to ti, where ti is the lookahead best response move
at s¯. The coordination ratio of lookahead dynamics is the worst possible ratio between the expected
social value of states on a polynomially long random walk on G and the optimal global social value.
For practical reasons, we are usually more interested in the dynamics of lookahead best-response
moves than in equilibria. For example, as with other equilibrium concepts, lookahead best-response
moves may not lead to lookahead equilibria. Indeed, such equilibria may not even exist. Typically,
though, the methods used to bound the coordination ratio for k-lookahead equilibria can be combined
with other techniques to bound the coordination ratio for k-lookahead dynamics. We show how to
do this for congestions games in Section 4; see also Goemans et al. [30] for several examples with
respect to 1-lookahead dynamics. Consequently, for both simplicity and brevity, most of the results
we give here concern the coordination ratio for lookahead equilibria. We are particularly interested in
discovering when lookahead equilibria guarantee good social solutions, and how outcomes vary with
different levels of foresight (k). We perform our analyses for an assortment of games including an
AdWord auction game, the Cournot game, congestion games, valid-utility games, and a cost-sharing
network design game.
4We begin, in Section 2, by considering strategic bidding in an AdWord generalised second-price
auction, and studying the social values of the allocations in the resulting equilibria. In particular, we
show that 2-lookahead game playing results in the optimal outcome or a constant-factor approximate
outcome under the leaf and path models, respectively. This is in contrast to 1-lookahead (myopic)
game playing which can result in arbitrarily poor equilibrium outcomes, and shows that more forward-
thinking bidders would produce efficient outcomes.
Second, in Section 3, we examine the Cournot duopoly game. Here two firms compete in producing
a good consumed by a set of buyers via the choice of production quantities. We study equilibria of
these simple games resulting from k-lookahead search. The equilibria of these simple games for myopic
game playing, k = 1, is well-understood. For k > 1, however, firms produce over 10% more than if
they were competing myopically; this is better for society as it leads to around a 5% increase in social
surplus. Surprisingly, the optimal level of foresight for society is k = 2. Furthermore, we show that
Stackelberg behaviours arise as a special case of lookahead search where the firms have asymmetric
computational abilities.
Third, in Section 4, we examine congestion games with linear latency functions, and study the
average of delay of players in those games. We show that 2-lookahead game playing results in constant-
factor approximate solutions. In particular, the coordination ratio of lookahead dynamics is a constant.
These guarantees are similar to those obtained via 1-lookahead.
Fourth, in Section 4.1, we consider two classes of resource sharing games, known as valid-utility
and basic-utility games. For both of these games, we show that lookahead game playing may result
in very poor solutions. For valid-utility games, we show k-lookahead can give a coordination ratio for
lookahead dynamics of Θ(
√
n). Myopic game play can also give very poor solutions [30], but additional
foresight does not significantly improve outcomes in the worst case. For basic-utility games, however,
myopic game dynamics give a constant coordination ratio [30] whereas we show that 2-lookahead game
playing may result in o(1)-approximate social welfare with the leaf model. Thus, additional foresight
in games need not lead to better outcomes, as is traditionally assumed in decision theory.
Finally, in Section 5, we present a simple example of a cost-sharing network design game that
illustrates how the use of lookahead search can encourage cooperative behaviour (and better outcomes)
without a coordination mechanism.
Observe that our results show that lookahead search has different effects depending upon the game.
It would be interested to study further which game structures lead to more beneficial outcomes when
longer foresight is used, and which game structures lead to more detrimental outcomes.
1.4. Background and Related Work.
This work is best viewed within the setting of bounded rationality pioneered by Herb Simon. In
Rational Choice Theory a rational agent (or economic man) makes decisions via utility maximisation.
Whilst the non-existence of economic man is not in doubt, rationality remains a central assumption in
economic thought. This is typically justified using an as if as expounded by Friedman [26]: whether
people are actually rationality or not is unimportant provided their actions can be viewed in a way
that is consistent with rational decision making - that is, provided agents act as if they are rational.3
Friedman concluded that a model should be judged by it predictive value rather than by the realism
of its assumptions. On this scale rationality often (but not always) does very well.
However, motivated by considerations of computational power and predictive ability, Simon [69]
argued that “the task is to replace the global rationality of economic man with a kind of rational
behaviour that is compatible with the access to information and the computational capacities that are
actually possessed by organisms, including man, in the kinds of environments in which such organisms
exist”. He argued that, instead of optimising, agents apply heuristics in decision making. An example
of this being the satisficing heuristic: agents search for feasible solutions, stopping when then discover
3For example, a consumer whose purchasing strategy allocates fixed proportions of her budget to specific
goods (regardless of price levels) can be viewed as rational consumer with a Cobb-Douglas utility function!
5an outcome that achieves an aspired level of satisfaction4. We remark that the use of a search phase
provides a fundamental distinction between rational and boundedly rational agents. For rational
agents the search is irrelevant as they will anyway make an optimal choice given the constraints of
the problem. For agents of bounded rationality the form of the search can heavily influence decision
making.
Interestingly, De Groot’s work on chess players also heavily influenced Simon’s general thinking on
cognitive science.5 This is exemplified in his famous book with Newell on human problem solving [57],
where humans are viewed as information processing systems.
The label bounded rationality is currently used in a number of disparate areas some of which actually
go against the main thrust of Simon’s original ideas; see Selten [64] and Rubenstein [59] for some
discussion on this point. Two schools of thought developed by psychologists, experimental economists,
and behavioural economists are, however, well worth mentioning here. First, the Heuristics and Biases
program espoused by Kahneman and Tversky and, second, the Fast and Frugal Heuristics program
espoused by Gigerenzer. Whilst both programs agree that humans routinely use simple heuristics in
decision making, their philosophical outlooks are very different. The former program primarily looks
for outcomes (caused by the use of heuristics) in violation of subjective excepted utility theory, and
views such biases as a sign of irrationality likely to lead to poor decision making. In contrast, the
latter program views the use of heuristics as natural and, in principle, entirely compatible with good
decision making. For example, simple heuristics may be more robust to environmental changes and
actually outperform methods based upon subjective excepted utility maximisation. As with the work
of Simon, for the fast and frugal heuristics school, the actual quality of an heuristic is assumed to be
dependent upon the search - how to search and when to stop searching - and the choice of decision rule
after the search is terminated. Clearly, the lookahead heuristic can be viewed in this light: there is a
search (via a local search tree), there is a “stopping rule” (determined, for example, by computational
constraints and by the expertise of the player), and there is a decision rule (backwards induction).
The value of lookahead search in decision-making has been examined by the artificial intelligence
community [55]; for examples in effective diagnostics and real-time planning see [40] and [63]. Looka-
head search is also related to the sequential thinking framework in game theory [52, 73]. However,
compared to these works and the research carried out by the two schools above, our focus is more
theoretical and less experimental and psychological. Specifically, we desire quantitative performance
guarantees for our heuristics.
Our research is also related to works on the price of anarchy in a game, and convergence of game
dynamics to approximately optimal solutions [50, 30] and to sink equilibria [30, 21]. Numerous articles
study the convergence rate of best-response dynamics to approximately optimal solutions [15, 23, 4, 9].
For example, polynomial-time bounds has been proven for the speed of convergence to approximately
optimal solutions for approximate Nash dynamics in a large class of potential games [4], and for
learning-based regret-minimisation dynamics for valid-utility games [9]. Our work differs from all
the above as none of them capture lookahead dynamics. In another line of work, convergence of
best-response dynamics to (approximate) equilibria and the complexity of game dynamics and sink
equilibria have been studied [22, 1, 14, 72, 21, 49], but our paper does not focus on these types of
dynamics or convergence to equilibria.
Motivated by concerns of stability, convergence, and predictability of equilibria and game dynamics,
various equilibrium concepts other than Nash equilibria have been studied in the economics literature.
Among them are correlated equilibria [2], stable equilibria [44], stochastic adjustment models [38],
strategy subsets closed under rational behaviour (CURB set) [6], iterative elimination of dominated
strategies, the set of undominated strategies, etc. Convergence and strategic stability of equilibria in
evolutionary game theory is also an important subject of study. Many other game-theoretic models
have been proposed to capture the self-interested behaviour of agents. As well as best-response
4Over time, and depending upon what is found in the search, this aspiration level may be changed.
5In fact, Simon sent his student George Baylor to help translate De Groot’s work into English.
6dynamics, noisy best-response dynamics [20, 79, 51], where players occasionally make mistakes, and
simultaneous Nash dynamics [7], where all players change their strategies simultaneously, are both
well-studied. In many other models the effect of learning algorithms [80] is examined, for example,
regret minimisation dynamics [25, 32, 33, 10, 8, 9, 19] and fictitious play [11]. In most of these studies
the most important factor is the stability of equilibria, and not measurements of the social value of
equilibria. Furthermore, most of them are motivated by theoretical game theoretic concepts rather
than practical game-playing, and none of the above works consider lookahead search.
2. Generalised Second-Price Auctions
For our first example, we apply the lookahead model to generalised second-price (GSP) auctions.
Our main results are that outcomes are provably good when agents use additional foresight; in contrast,
myopic behaviour can produce very poor outcomes.
The auction set-up is as follows. There are T slots with click-through rates c1 > c2 > ... > cT > 0,
that is, higher indexed slots have lower click-through rates. There are n players bidding for these
slots, each with a private valuation vi. Each player i makes a bid bi. Slots are then allocated via a
generalised second price auction. Denote the jth highest bid in the descending bid sequence by bj ,
with corresponding valuation vj . The jth best slot, for j ≤ T , is assigned to the jth highest bidder
who is charged a price equal to bj+1. The T highest bidders are called the “winners”. According to
the pricing mechanism, if bidder i were to get slot t in the final assignment, then he would get utility
uit = (v
i − bt+1)ct. We denote a player i’s utility if he bids bi by ui(bi) (the other players bids are
implicit inputs for ui).
This auction is used in the context of keyword ad auctions (e.g, Google AdWords) for sponsored
search. Given the continuous nature of bids in the GSP auction, the best response of each bidder i
for any vector of bids by other bidders corresponds to a range of bid values that will result in the
same outcome from i’s perspective. Among these set of bid values, we focus on a specific bid value
bi, called the balanced bid [13]. The balanced bid bi is a best-response bid that is as high as possible
such that player i cannot be harmed by a player with a better slot undercutting him, i.e. bidding just
below him. It is easy to calculate that for player i in slot t, 1 ≤ t < T , the only balanced bid is
bi = (1− ct
ct−1
)vi +
ct
ct−1
bt+1.
An important property of balanced bidding is that each “losing” player i (one not assigned a slot)
should bid truthfully, that is bi = vi. To see this add dummy slots with ct = 0 if t > T . The player
who wins the top slot should also bid truthfully under balanced bidding. Balanced bidding is the most
commonly used bidding strategy [13, 48]. For some intuition behind this, note that balanced bidding
has several desirable properties. For a competitive firm, bidding high obviously increases the chance
of obtaining a good slot. Within a slot this also has the benefit of pushing up the price a competitor
pays without affecting the price paid by the firm. On the other hand, bidding high increases the upper
bound on the price the firm may pay, leading to the possibility that the firm may end up paying a high
price for one of the less desirable slots. Balanced bidding eliminates the possibility that a change in
bid from a higher bidder can hurt the firm. (Clearly, it is impossible to obtain such a guarantee with
respect to a lower bidder.) Thus, balanced bidding provides some of the benefits of high bidding at
less risk. Balanced bidding naturally converges to Nash equilibria unlike other bidding strategies such
as altruistic bidding or competitor busting [13]. Moreover, the other bidding strategies would require
some discretization of players’ strategy space in order to analyse the best response dynamics [13, 48].
Consequently, balanced bidding is the most natural strategy choice for our analysis.
For this auction problem, we consider only the leaf model. The leaf model seems more natural
than the path model for a single auction as players are interested in the final allocation output by the
auction (there are no intermediary payoffs). We analyse both worst-case and average-case lookahead;
depending upon the level of risk-aversion of the agents both cases seem natural in auction settings.
7Let player i’s lookahead payoff (or utility) at bid bi with respect to player j, denoted by uij(bi), be
player i’s payoff (or utility) after player j makes a best-response move. In the worst-case lookahead
model, we define player i’s lookahead payoff for a vector b¯ of bids as Πi,b¯ = u˜
i(bi) = minj u
ij(bi). In
the average-case lookahead model, player i’s lookahead payoff Πi,b¯ for a bid vector b¯ is Πi,b¯ = u¯
i(bi) =
1
n
∑
j u
ij(bi). Changing strategy from bid bi to bid b¯i is a lookahead improving move if lookahead
utility increases, i.e., u¯i(b¯i) > u˜i(bi). We are at a lookahead equilibrium if no player has a lookahead
improving move.
It is known that the social welfare of Nash equilibria for myopic game playing can be arbitrarily
bad [13] unless we disallow over-bidding [46]. Here, we prove the advantage of additional foresight by
showing that 2-lookahead equilibria have much better social welfare. In particular, we show that all
such equilibria are optimal in the worst-case lookahead model, and all such equilibria are constant-
factor approximate solutions in the average-case lookahead model.
2.1. Worst-Case Lookahead.
Our proof for the worst-case lookahead model can be seen as a generalisation of the proof of [12] for
a slightly different model. We start by proving a useful lemma in this context.
Lemma 2.1. Consider the worst-case lookahead model with the leaf model. Label the players so that
player i is in slot i, and suppose there is a player t such that vt < vt+1. Then player t myopically
prefers slot t+ 1 to slot t.
Proof. Suppose not. Then, as player t does not myopically prefer slot t+ 1 we have
(vt − bt+1)ct ≥ (vt − bt+2)ct+1
By definition, bt+1 = vt+1 − ct+1ct (vt+1 − bt+2). Plugging this in gives
(vt − bt+2)ct+1 ≤
(
vt − ct − ct+1
ct
vt+1 − ct+1
ct
bt+2
)
ct <
(
ct+1
ct
vt − ct+1
ct
bt+2
)
ct = (vt − bt+2)ct+1
Thus we obtain our desired contradiction. Note that the strict inequality above follows directly from
the fact that vt < vt+1. 
An equilibrium is output truthful if the slots are assigned to the same bidders as they would be if
bidders were to bid truthfully. It is easy to verify that an an allocation optimizes solcial welfare if
and only if it is output truthful. Thus to prove 2-lookahead equilibria are socially optimal it suffices
to show they are output truthful.
Theorem 2.2. For GSP auctions, any 2-lookahead equilibrium gives optimal social welfare in the
worst-case, leaf model.
Proof. We proceed by contradiction. Consider a non-output-truthful 2-lookahead equilibrium. Again,
label the players so that the player i is in slot i. Amongst all the winning players, take the one with
the lowest valuation, vi. First suppose that vi is not amongst the T highest valuations. Then, there is
a losing player with a higher value than vi. But this player is bidding his value, as a result of balanced
bidding. Consequently, player i’s utility must be negative, a contradiction.
Thus, we may assume that vi is amongst the T highest valuations; specifically it must have exactly
the T th highest valuation. We will show that player i moving into slot T is a lookahead improving
move. Notice that the lookahead value for player i staying in slot i is at most the myopic value of
staying in that slot. This follows as the choice of a player two slots below i cannot improve the utility
of player i (neither in terms of price nor slot position), but only could make it worse. Hence, it suffices
to show that the lookahead value of changing slots is better than the myopic value of staying in slot i.
By several applications of Lemma 2.1, we see that player i myopically prefers slot T to slot i.
However, in moving to slot T , player i will still make a balanced bid. Thus, no other winning player
may reduce i’s utility by undercutting him. Also, no losing player j wants to move to a winning slot as
8they can only be left with negative utility - since j cannot then be amongst the T highest valuations.
So moving to slot T is a lookahead improving move for player i.
If player i were originally in slot T , then the entire argument can be applied with regards to slots
1 to T − 1. Inductively, we then conclude that in any non-output-truthful equilibrium, there is a
lookahead improving move, which is a contradiction. This gives us the desired result. 
2.2. Average Case Lookahead.
Next, we consider the average-case lookahead model. and show that the above theorem does not hold
for this case.
Theorem 2.3. In GSP auctions, there exist 2-lookahead equilibria that are not output-truthful in the
average-case, leaf model.
Proof. Consider the following example with n = T = 4. Let the click-through rates be c1 = 35, c2 =
26, c3 = 25, and c4 = 20. Let the valuations be v1 = 82, v2 = 83, v3 = 100, v4 = 93. Starting with the
highest slot and working to the lowest, let bidder i bid the balanced bid for slot i. It can be verified
that this turns out to be a non-output-truthful equilibria. 
Despite this negative result, 2-lookahead equilibria cannot have arbitrarily bad social welfare.
Theorem 2.4. In GSP auctions, the coordination ratio of 2-lookahead equilibria is constant in the
average-case, leaf model.
Proof. Suppose that we are at an equilibrium. Let vi∗ be the i
th highest valuation, let player i∗ denote
the corresponding player, let bi∗ denote their bid, and ci∗ be the click through rate of the slot they
currently occupy. We recall that vi denotes the player in slot i and it has click through rate ci and bid
bi. The social utility of a set A of players is
∑
i∈A vici. Thus, by the above definitions, the optimal
social utility is
∑
i vi∗ci.
Now, choose α, β < 1 such that (1−α)2 > mβ. Let I be the set of indices i that satisfy both vi < αvi∗
and ci∗ < βci. Note that for all i /∈ I the pair of players vi, vi∗ contribute at least min{α, β}vi∗ci to
OPT. So if I is empty, then we have achieved a constant coordination ratio. We may thus suppose I
is not empty and choose i ∈ I.
Consider ci∗−1. As we assume “balanced” bidding,
bi∗ ≥ (1− ci
∗
ci∗−1
)vi∗
Since bi∗ < bi < vi < αvi∗ by assumption, we have ci∗−1 < 11−αci∗ . Choose m > 1. We first prove the
following claim.
Claim 2.5. For all i ∈ I, we have ci+1 ≤ cim .
Proof. Suppose ci+1 >
ci
m , for some i ∈ I. We will show that player i∗ moving into slot i is then
lookahead improving. Consider his lookahead utility for staying put. Ignoring a repeat move for
player i∗, which occurs with probability 1n , player i
∗’s utility in every other circumstance is at most
ci∗−1vi∗ , as other players can improve his position by at most one. On the other hand, if player i∗
moves into slot i then his lookahead utility is at least ci+1(vi∗− bi); he wins at least slot i+1 and pays
at most his bid. If player i is chosen to repeat his move then his utility is the same for both cases (as
he will then simply play a best response move). Thus, it is enough for us to show that
ci+1(vi∗ − bi) > ci∗−1vi∗
9However bi < vi < αvi∗ and putting this together with the above inequalities gives
ci+1(vi∗ − bi) > ci
m
(1− α)vi∗
≥ β
1− αcivi∗
≥ β
1− αcivi∗
>
1
1− αci∗vi∗
> ci∗−1vi∗
We are now done, by our choice of α and β, and have shown that player i∗ moving into slot i is a
lookahead improving move. This contradicts the fact we are at an equilibria. 
Thus we have established that for all i ∈ I, ci+1 < cim . Thus, we can bound the optimal social
utility contributed by the slots i ∈ I by mm−1ci0vi0∗ where i0 = mini∈I i.
Now if 1 /∈ I then we have achieved our constant coordination ratio since then either c1v1 > αc1v1∗
or c1∗v1∗ ≥ βc1v1∗ . Hence, we are guaranteed at least min{α, β}c1v1∗ ≥ min{α, β}ci0vi0∗, that is, a
least a constant factor of the social utility from all the slots in I in the optimal allocation. So we
suppose 1 ∈ I.
Choose α1 =
m
m−1α and consider the player currently in slot 2. By this choice of α1, we ensure that
this player does not have value more than α1v1∗ . To see this, recall the player is bidding in a balanced
manner and so, by Claim 2.5, his bid b2 satisfies
v2 ≥ b2 ≥ (1− c2
c1
)v2 ≥ (1− 1
m
)v2
On the other hand, as 1 ∈ I we have
b1 = v1 ≤ αv1∗
Thus, we must have v2 ≤ mm−1αv1∗ = α1v1∗ or the second player would win the first slot.
Now let Γ be the set of players with value at least α1v1∗ . Choose some constant γ. If |Γ| < γn,
then player 1∗’s lookahead utility for moving into slot one is at least (1− γ)(1−α1)v1∗c1. If player 1∗
stays put, ignoring a repeat move for player 1∗, which occurs with probability 1n , player i
∗’s utility in
every other circumstance is at most
c1∗−1v1∗ <
1
1− αc1∗v1∗ <
β
1− αc1v1∗
Since player 1∗’s utility is the same for both cases when a repeated move occurs and since we can
choose β sufficiently small (i.e, β < (1− γ)(1−α)(1−α1)), player 1∗ will improve by moving into slot
1 in this case, contradicting the fact that we are at an equilibrium.
Thus, we may suppose |Γ| > γn. Let i1 = maxi∈Γ i. Then the players in Γ contribute at least
γnα1v1∗ci1 to the social utility. Take a constant δ and suppose that ci1 ≥ δ c1n . Then the players in Γ
would contribute at least γδα1c1v1∗ . Again, this a constant fraction of social utility that is contributed
in the optimal allocation by player 1∗ which, in turn, is a constant factor of the optimal social utility
of the slots in I. Thus, we would achieve a constant factor of the optimal social utility.
So we may assume ci1 < δ
c1
n . Consider player i1. His lookahead utility for staying in place, ignoring
the case of a repeated move, is at most
ci1−1vi1 ≤
1
1− αci1vi1 ≤
1
1− α
δ
n
c1vi1 ≤
1
1− α
δ
n
c1vi∗
We may assume that player v1 ≤ (1−)α1v1∗ , for some constant , otherwise we are done. Therefore,
if player i1 moves to slot 1 then he will earn at least c1v1∗ provided that player 1 makes the next
move. This occurs with probability 1/n, and so his total lookahead utility, ignoring a repeated move,
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is at least nc1v1∗ . Thus by choosing δ ≤ (1− α), it follows that the coordination ratio is constant in
the average case model. 
3. Industrial Organisation: Cournot Competition
Next we consider the classical game theoretic topic of duopolistic competition. Economists have
considered a number of alternative models for market competition [75], prominent amongst them is
the Cournot model [17]. Our main result here is that the social surplus increases when firms are not
myopic; surprisingly, social welfare is actually maximized when firms use 2-lookahead.
The Cournot model assumes players sell identical, nondifferentiated goods, and studies competition
in terms of quantity (rather than price). Each player takes turns choosing some quantity of good to
produce, qi, and pays some marginal cost to produce it, c. The price for the good is then set as a
function of the quantities produced by both players, P (qi+qj) = (a−qi−qj), for some constant a > c.
On turn l, each player i makes profit: Πli(qi, qj) = qi(a − qi − qj − c). In this form, the model then
has only has one equilibrium, called the Cournot equilibrium, where qi = (a− c)/3 for each player. At
equilibrium, each player make a profit of Πi(qi, qj) = qi(1− 2qi). The consumer surplus is 2q2i and the
social surplus is then 2qi(1− qi).
3.1. Production under Lookahead Search.
We analyse this game when players apply k-lookahead search. In industrial settings it is natural to
assume that payoffs are collected over time (as in a repeated game); thus, we focus upon the path
model. We define this model inductively. In a k-step lookahead path model, each player i’s utility is
the sum of his utilities in the current turn and the k − 1 subsequent turns. He models the quantities
chosen in the subsequent turns as though the player acting during those turns were playing the game
with a smaller lookahead. More specifically, he assumes that the player acting in the t’th subsequent
turn chooses their quantity to maximise their utility under a k−t lookahead model. In order to rewrite
this rigorously, let piil be the contribution to his utility that player i expects on the lth subsequent
turn (and pii0 be the contribution to his utility that player i expects on his current turn), let pi
j
l be
the contribution to player j’s utility that player i expects on the l’th subsequent turn, and let qil
(respectively, qjl ) be the quantity that player i expects to choose (respectively, expects his opponent
to choose) under this model.
Then in the path model, player i’s expected utility function is Πi =
∑k−1
t=0 pi
i
t. Player j’s expected
utility function on player i’s turn is Πj =
∑k−1
t=0 pi
j
t . Our aim now is to determine the quantities that
player i expects to be chosen by both players in the subsequent turns and, thereby, determine the
quantity he chooses this turn and the utility he expects to garner. To facilitate the discussion, it
should be noted that unless noted otherwise, any reference to a “turn” refers to a turn during player
i’s calculation and not an actual game turn.
To simplify our analysis, we will define ql to be the quantity chosen on turn l by whichever player
is acting and Πl to be the expected utility that that player garners from turn l to turn k. So Π0 = Π
i,
Π1 =
∑k−1
t=1 pi
j
t , etc. We define Πl to be the utility garnered from turn l to turn k by the player who
does not act during turn l. So Π0 = Π
j , Π1 =
∑k−1
t=1 pi
i
t, etc. It is clear that on each turn l, the active
player is trying to maximise Πl.
We are now ready to compute these quantities and utilities recursively. We may assume that a = 1
and c = 0. By our definition above, we have that Πk = qk(1−qk−qk−1) and Πk = qk−1(1−qk−qk−1).
Our definition also gives us the recursive formula for l < k that Πl = ql(1 − ql − ql−1) + Πl+1 and
Πl = ql−1(1− ql − ql−1) + Πl+1. Note that in each of these formulas, Πl and Πl are each functions of
qt for t ≥ l; ql−1 is in fact fixed on the previous turn and is, therefore, not a variable in Πl. It is now
possible to calculate ql recursively.
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Lemma 3.1. The form of ql is βl − αlql−1, where βk = αk = βk−1 = 12 , αk−1 = 13 and, for l < k − 1,
βl =
2− βl+1 + αl+1βl+2 − αl+1αl+2βl+1
4− 2αl+1 − α2l+1αl+2
, αl =
1
4− 2αl+1 − α2l+1αl+2
Proof. We proceed by inducting down from qk. Consider qk which is the active player’s choice on the
final turn. As it is the final turn, he is acting myopically and so will choose qk so as to maximise
Πk = qk(1 − qk − qk−1). This parobala as a function of qk is maximised when qk = 1−qk−12 . Doing
a similar calculation for Πk−1 = qk−1(1− qk−1 − qk−2) + Πk gives us the desired values for βk−1 and
αk−1. We now assume the lemma for all l > L and try to prove it for qL. Recall the recursive formula
ΠL = qL(1 − qL − qL−1) + ΠL+1. Taking the derivative of this with respect to qL and setting it all
equal to zero gives us
0 = (1− 2qL − qL−1) + (1− 2qL − qL+1)− ∂qL+1
∂qL
qL − ∂qL+1
∂qL
qL+2 +
∂ΠL+2
∂qL+2
∂qL+2
∂qL
The last term of the above sum is zero, since qL+2 is chosen so that
∂ΠL+2
qL+2
= 0. Thus, if we plug in
the inductive hypothesis into the above equation and simplify, we get
2 − βL+1 + αL+1βL+2 − αL+1βL+2 − αL+1αL+2βL+1 = (4− 2αL+1 − α2L+1αL+2)qL − qL−1
This gives us the desired result. 
Our goal is now to calculate q0 as this will tell us the quantity that player i actually chooses
on his turn. From the above lemma, we can calculate q0 if we can determine α0 and β0. Using
numerical methods on the above recursive formula, we see that as k → ∞, α0 decreases towards a
limit of 0.2955977 . . . and β0 approaches a limit of 0.4790699 . . .. These values also converge quite
quickly; they both converge to within 0.0001 of the limiting value for k ≥ 10. Thus, at a lookahead
equilibrium, player i will choose qi ≈ .0.4790699−0.2955977qj and player j, symmetrically, will choose
qj ≈ 0.4790699−0.2955977qi. So each player will choose a quantity q ≈ 0.369767. which is more than
in the myopic equilibrium. Indeed, it is easy to show that for every k ≥ 2, each player will produce
more than the myopic equilibrium. This is illustrated in Figure 1. Observe the quantity produced
does not change monotonically with the length of foresight k, but it does increase significantly if
non-myopic lookahead is applied at all. Consequently, in the path model looking ahead is better for
society overall but worse for each individual firm’s profitability (as the increase in sales is outweighed
by the consequent reduction in price).
Figure 1. How output varies with foresight k
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Theorem 3.2. For Cournot games under the path model, output at a k-lookahead equilibrium peaks
at k = 2 with output 12.5% larger than at a myopic equilibrium (k = 1). As foresight increases, output
is 10.9% larger in the limit. The associated rises in social surplus are 5.5% and 4.9%, respectively,
3.2. Stackelberg Behaviour.
We could also analyse this game under the leaf model, but this model is both less realistic here and
trivial to analyse. However, it is interesting to note that for the leaf model with asymmetric lookahead,
where player i has 2-lookahead and player j has 1-lookahead, we get the same equilibrium as the classic
Stackelberg model for competition. Thus, the use of lookahead search can generate leader-follower
behaviours.
4. Unsplittable Selfish Routing
Now consider the unsplittable selfish routing game. We show that any 2-lookahead equilibrium has
a constant coordination ratio. We then show how to derive a similar result for 2-lookahead dynamics.
For this game we have a directed graph G = (V,E) and a set of n agents. Agent i wants to route 1
unit of flow from a source si to a destination ti. Each agent i chooses an si−ti path Pi and these paths
together generate a flow f . We assume that there is a linear latency function λe(fe) = aefe + be on
each edge edge e ∈ E. The total latency of a flow f is denoted l(f) = ∑e∈E λe(fe)fe = (aefe + be)fe.
The latency of player i is denoted li(f) =
∑
e∈Pi aefe + be; observe that l(f) =
∑
i∈U li(f). For this
game, we consider 2-lookahead in both the leaf and path models, under the average-case lookahead
model.
Recall, in the leaf model, a player i’s move from a flow f to a flow f ′ is lookahead improving if
E(li(f
′′)|f ′) > E(li(f ′′)|f) where f ′′ is the flow obtained after the next player (chosen uniformly at
random amongst all the players) makes a (myopic) best response. In the path model a player i’s move
from a flow f to a flow f ′ is lookahead improving if 12 li(f
′) + 12E(li(f
′′)|f ′) > 12 li(f) + 12E(f ′′|f) where
f ′′ is as above.
Theorem 4.1. In the average-case 2-lookahead leaf model, the coordination ratio for an equilibrium
is at most (1 +
√
5)2.
Proof. This proof adapts the result in [3] to our setting. Let f be any flow at a lookahead equilibrium
and f∗ be an optimal flow. Suppose player i is taking path Pj in flow f and path P ∗j in flow f
∗. Let
J(e) be the set of players using edge e in the flow f and let J∗(e) be the same for f∗.
At a lookahead equilibrium, player j doesn’t want to move from Pj to P
∗
j . This means that after
a random/worst case next move, the strategy Pj has a higher (expected) payoff than the strategy
P ∗j . In particular, it must the case that the best possible outcome resulting from from choosing Pj
has a higher (expected) payoff than the worst possible outcome resulting from the strategy P ∗j . In
the former case, the best possible outcome is that the next player had also been using the path Pj
but then moves completely off the path. Similarly, in the latter case, the worst possible outcome is
that the next player had not been using any edge on the path P ∗j but then changes strategy and also
selects the path P ∗j entirely. Thus we must have:
∑
e∈P ∗j
ae(fe + 2) + be ≥
∑
e∈Pj
aefe + be −
∑
e∈Pj :fe≥2
ae
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Summing over all players j, we obtain
∑
j
∑
e∈P ∗j
ae(fe + 2) + be ≥
∑
j
∑
e∈Pj
aefe + be −
∑
e∈Pj :fe≥2
ae

=
∑
e∈E
∑
j∈J(e)
aefe + be −
∑
j
∑
e∈Pj :fe≥2
ae
=
∑
e∈E
(aefe + be)fe −
∑
e∈Pj :fe≥2
aefe
≥
∑
e∈E
(aefe + be)fe −
∑
e∈Pj :fe≥2
1
2
aef
2
e
≥
∑
e∈E
1
2
(aefe + be)fe
=
1
2
∑
e∈E
λe(fe)
Rearranging gives and applying the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality6 produces
1
2
∑
e∈E
λe(fe) ≤
∑
j
∑
e∈P ∗j
ae(fe + 2) + be
=
∑
e∈E
(ae(fe + 2) + be)f
∗
e
≤
∑
e∈E
aefef
∗
e + (2ae + be)f
∗
e
≤
∑
e∈E
aefef
∗
e + 2λe(f
∗
e )
≤
√∑
e∈E
aef2e ·
√∑
e∈E
aef∗e
2 + 2
∑
e∈E
λe(f
∗
e )
≤
√∑
e∈E
λe(fe) ·
√∑
e∈E
λe(f∗e ) + 2
∑
e∈E
λe(f
∗
e )
Set ρ =
√∑
e λe(fe)∑
e λe(f
∗
e )
and observe that ρ2 is the coordination ratio, given we choose the worst
lookahead equilibrium f . Consequently, 12ρ
2 ≤ ρ+ 2. Solving gives ρ ≤ 1 +√5 as desired. 
Next we consider the lookahead dynamics and study coordination ratio for the lookahead dynamics.
Theorem 4.2. In the average-case 2-lookahead model, the coordination ratio for lookahead dynamics
is a constant for the leaf model.
Proof. We follow a similar approach to Theorem 4.1 in [30] and start by proving some sub-lemmas.
Lemma 4.3. If player i makes a lookahead improving move from path Pi to P
′
i which changes the
flow from f to f ′i then li(f
′
i) ≤ 2li(f) + 1n l(f).
6For any two vectors x and y, we have xTy ≤
√
xTx ·
√
yTy.
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Proof. So player i’s lookahead cost with f ′i is less than his cost with f . Moreover, we can lower bound
the lookahead cost of f ′i by the quantity∑
e∈P ′i
fe
n
(aefe + be) + (1− fe
n
)(ae(fe + 1) + be)
=
∑
e∈P ′i
ae(fe + 1) + be − fe
n
ae
≥
∑
e∈P ′i
(1− 1
n
)ae(fe + 1) + be
≥
∑
e∈P ′i
(1− 1
n
)(ae(fe + 1) + be)
= (1− 1
n
)li(f
′
i)
This would be the cost incurred if the randomly selected next player j avoids any edge e that player
i is on (either by moving away from e or not moving onto e). Using similar reasoning, we may upper
bound the cost to player i of sticking with Pi by∑
e∈Pi
fe
n
(aefe + be) + (1− fe
n
)(ae(fe + 1) + be)
=
∑
e∈Pi
(aefe + be) + (1− fe
n
)ae
≤
∑
e∈Pi
ae(fe + 1) + be ≤
∑
e∈Pi
2aefe + be
≤ 2li(f)
Here we assumed the next player j selects every edge e that player i is on (either by staying on e or
by moving onto e). Therefore, li(f
′
i) ≤ 2(1 + 1n−1)li(f) which implies the statement in the lemma. 
Applying Lemma 4.3 with Lemma 4.2 in [30], we get:
Lemma 4.4. If agent i changes his path from Pi to P
′
i , changing the flow from f to f
′
i , then l(f
′
i) ≤
l(f) + (d + 1)li(f
′
i) − li(f). In particular, if agent i makes a lookahead improving move then l(f ′i) ≤
(1 + 1n)l(f) + 3li(f).
Now, applying Lemma 4.4 with Lemma 4.3 in [30].
Lemma 4.5. Let f be the current flow. Suppose we chose a player at random and they make a
lookahead best response resulting in flow f ′. Then E(li(f ′)|f) ≤ (1 + 4n)l(f).
Finally, we prove the following lemma which will imply the statement of the theorem.
Lemma 4.6. Let f be the current flow. Suppose we chose a player at random and they make a
lookahead best response resulting in flow f ′. Then either E(l(f ′)|f) ≤ (1 − 12n)l(f) or l(f) < (6 +√
37)OPT .
Proof. Suppose player i changes his path from Pj to P
′
j resulting in the flow changing from f to f
′
i .
Thus E(l(f ′)|f) = 1n
∑
i l(f
′
i).
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Case 1:
∑
i 4li(f
′
i) ≤
∑
i li(f)
E(l(f ′)|f) = 1
n
∑
i
l(f ′i)
≤ 1
n
∑
i
l(f) + li(f
′
i)− li(f) +
∑
e∈P ′i−Pi
aefi,e
≤ 1
n
∑
i
l(f) + 2li(f
′
i)− li(f)
≤ 1
n
∑
i
l(f) +
1
2
li(f)− li(f)
= (1− 1
2n
)l(f)
Case 2:
∑
i 4li(f
′
i) >
∑
i li(f) = l(f)
Let f∗ be the optimal flow and let P ∗i be player i’s path in this flow. Let J
∗(e) be the set of
players on edge e in f∗. Since P ′i is a lookahead best response, we may apply Lemma 4.3 to see that
li(f
′
i) ≤ 2li(f∗) + 1n l(f∗). Thus
l(f) < 4
∑
i
li(f
′
i) ≤ 4
∑
i
2li(f
∗) +
1
n
l(f∗)
= 12
∑
i
li(f
∗) = 12
∑
i
∑
e∈E
aef
∗
e + be
≤ 12
∑
e∈E
∑
i∈J∗(e)
ae(fe + 1) + be
= 12
∑
e∈E
aefef
∗
e bef
∗
e + aef
∗
e
≤ 12
√
l(f)l(f∗) + l(f∗)
where the last inequality follows from Cauchy-Schwartz. Thus, if we set x =
√
l(f)
OPT , the above can
be transformed into the inequality x2 ≤ 12x+ 1. 
The remainder of the proof of Theorem 4.2 follows by applying the above lemmas as shown in
[30]. 
4.1. Valid Utility Games.
Here is a bad example for the path model (a slightly modified example applies to the leaf model). It
applies for any number t of lookahead moves. Take a Steiner Set System S(2, k, n). For example, these
exist with n = q2 +q+1 and k = q+1. Let each subset in the system induce a ”sub-game” - thus each
pair of players are together in exactly one subgame. Consequently, each player is in n−1k−1 = q + 1 = k
subgames, and n games in total. The strategy set of a player i in subgame g is {ygi , xgi,1, xgi,2, . . . , xgi,k}.
It has one nice strategy and k naughty strategies: player i always gets one point for playing the nice
strategy ygi , but gets two points for playing a naughty strategy x
g
i,li
provided
∑
j lj = i mod k, where
the sum is over all players j who are playing a strategy xgj,lj - we call i the winner of subgame g in
the case.
Thus a player i who moves next can guarantee k points by playing ys but can guarantee 2k points
by playing xgs to win all k subgames it is in. Moreover, the player can lose at most one game in
each subsequent time period. This follows as the next t = k players share exactly one game each with
player i. Thus the player, in the worst case receives 2k+ 2(k− 1) + · · ·+ 4 + 2 = k(k+ 1) in the next
k moves. This is greater than the k2 payoff from playing only ys.
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Consider then the dynamics of this game under k-lookahead search. Over time, at any state of
play, the total value of the game will be 2n; in each of the n subgames all the players are behaving
naughtily. The optimal value however is n(k + 1); in each subgame, k − 1 of the players are nice and
one is naughty. So we have shown:
Lemma 4.7. For valid utility games, in the path model the coordination ratio of k-lookahead dynamics
is at least k+12 =
t+1
2 ≥ 12
√
n. 
4.2. Basic Utility Games.
For basic utility games, good guarantees can be obtained for the path model. More interestingly, for
the leaf model lookahead equilibria can be extremely bad, even for 2-lookahead equilibria.
Lemma 4.8. In basic utility games, the coordination ratio of 2-lookahead equilibria can be arbitrarily
bad in the leaf model.
Proof. Consider the following symmetric 2-player game. Let each player have a groundset {B, T,G}.
A feasible strategy consists of playing at most one action in the groundset. We create a submodular
social function using the table
∅ B T G
B 6 6 6 1
T κ-9 κ-9 7 4
G κ-5 κ-10 8 5
Set γ(∅, ∅) = 0. Then let the ijth entry of the matrix, δij , be the marginal value of adding action i
when action j is being played by the other player. For example, γ(B, ∅) = γ(∅, ∅) + δB,∅ = 0 + 6 = 6.
Similarly, γ(B,B) = 12, γ(T, ∅) = κ− 9, γ(G, ∅) = κ− 5, γ(B,G) = κ− 4, γ(B, T ) = κ− 3, γ(T, T ) =
κ− 2, γ(T,G) = κ− 1, γ(G,G) = κ.
We need to extend this definition to all subsets. Suppose that Player 1 is currently choosing S1 and
Player 2 is currently choosing S2. To complete the definition of γ, we say that the marginal value of
adding action i to the subset S = S1 ∪ S2, is δi,S = minj∈S1∪S2 δij .
Note that this is true if i is added to S1 and if i is added to S2. This processes produces a submodular
social function. The payoff functions are then defined in accordance with the Vickrey condition.
Clearly, as the players are constrained to play singleton actions, the optimal solution Ω = {G,G}
has value κ. We claim that {B,B}, with social value 12, is the only equilibrium in the leaf model.
Thus, for any κ, we can be a factor Ω(κ) away from the optimal social value.
To prove this, first suppose that Player 1 plays B. According to the Vickrey condition, the best
response of Player 2 is to play T (she needs to choose ∗ maximize γ(B, ∗)). The payoff to player 1 is
then γ(B, T ) − γ(∅, T ) = (κ − 3) − (κ − 9) = 6. Second suppose that Player 1 plays T . According
to the Vickrey condition, the best response of Player 2 is to play G (she needs to maximize γ(T, ∗)).
The payoff to player 1 is then γ(T,G) − γ(∅, G) = (κ − 1) − (κ − 5) = 4. Finally suppose that
Player 1 plays G. According to the Vickrey condition, the best response of Player 2 is to play G
- observe this must be the case as (G,G) is the optimal solution. The payoff to player 1 is then
γ(G,G)− γ(∅, G) = κ− (κ− 5) = 5.
Thus, with 2-lookahead, Player 1 will always think it in his interest to play B. (Note that in the
leaf model, it is irrelevant for Player 1 what strategy Player 2 is currently playing.) By a symmetric
argument, Player 2 will always think it in her interest to play B. 
5. Shapley Network Design Games
For our final example we show that the use of lookahead search may allow for “uncoordinated”
cooperative behaviours. By looking ahead, a player may select a cooperative move whose consequence
can be to induce other players to also make cooperative moves. We give a very simple illustration
of this behaviour. Consider the following Shapley network design game: Given a network, there is a
single source s and a single sink t. We have n players, each wanting to route from s to t. There are N
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paths (where N may be exponential) to choose from. The cost of any link is equally shared between
those players that use it. The coordination ratio is then easily seen to be at least n. However, the
coordination ratio improves by a factor k, when the players use k-lookahead search.
Theorem 5.1. The coordination ratio of k-lookahead dynamics for Shapley network design games in
the leaf model is at most n/k.
Proof. We present the proof for the worst-case lookahead model. The proof for the average-case model
uses the same idea. Assume the players are currently choosing the paths {P¯1, P¯2, . . . , P¯n}. Consider
the depth k tree when the players move in the order 1, 2, . . . , k. Take a decision node for player k− 1.
This has N children that are decision nodes for player k. Let the paths chosen by player k at these
nodes be Q1, Q2, . . . , QN , respectively. Suppose that in response to this move, player k − 1 chooses
the path Pj . We claim that Pj = Qj .
c(P, T ′) =
∑
e∈P/(Qj∪Pj)
ce
ne
+
∑
e∈P∩Qj∩Pj
ce
ne
+
∑
e∈(P∩Qj)/Pj
ce
ne + 1
+
∑
e∈(P∩Pj)/Qj
ce
ne − 1
= c(P, T )−
∑
e∈(P∩Qj)/Pj
(
ce
ne
− ce
ne + 1
)
+
∑
e∈(P∩Pj)/Qj
(
ce
ne − 1 −
ce
ne
)
Thus
c(Qj , T ′) = c(Qj , T )−
∑
e∈Qj/Pj
(
ce
ne
− ce
ne + 1
)
Now since c(Qj , T ) ≤ c(P, T ) we have
c(P, T ′) = c(P, T )−
∑
e∈(P∩Qj)/Pj
(
ce
ne
− ce
ne + 1
)
+
∑
e∈(P∩Pj)/Qj
(
ce
ne − 1 −
ce
ne
)
≥ c(Qj , T )−
∑
e∈(P∩Qj)/Pj
(
ce
ne
− ce
ne + 1
)
+
∑
e∈(P∩Pj)/Qj
(
ce
ne − 1 −
ce
ne
)
≥ c(Qj , T )−
∑
e∈(P∩Qj)/Pj
(
ce
ne
− ce
ne + 1
)
≥ c(Qj , T )−
∑
e∈Qj/Pj
(
ce
ne
− ce
ne + 1
)
= c(Qj , T ′)
This proves the claim. Applying induction, we see that each player 1, . . . , k will play the same
strategy P ∗, and thus, receive the same payoff. Let’s take the worst case choice for players 2, . . . , k
from the point of view of player 1. If P ∗ = PSP , the shortest s − t path, then each of the k chosen
players will have a cost of at most
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c(PSP )
k
≤ opt
k
Thus, if P ∗ 6= PSP , then player 1 can guarantee himself a cost of at most optk . This argument
applies for all players so, in an equilibrium, the total cost is at most, nkopt. 
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